United Nations S/2006/333

Security Council

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1 June 2006

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

(for the period from 10 December 2005 to 1 June 2006)

I. Introduction

1. The present report gives an account of the activities of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) during the past six months pursuant to the mandate contained in Security Council resolution 350 (1974) and extended in subsequent resolutions, most recently resolution 1648 (2005) of 21 December 2005.

II. Situation in the area and activities of the Force

2. During the period under review the ceasefire in the Israel-Syria sector was maintained and the UNDOF area of operations remained generally quiet except in the Shab'a farms area (area 6), which experienced activity originating from the area of operation of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), described in my reports on UNIFIL.

3. UNDOF supervised the area of separation by means of fixed positions and patrols to ensure that military forces of either party were excluded from it. The Force also carried out fortnightly inspections of equipment and force levels in the areas of limitation. Liaison officers from the party concerned accompanied the inspection teams. As in the past, both sides denied inspection teams access to some of their positions and imposed some restrictions on the Force's freedom of movement. In addition, Israeli national Customs officials continued to operate at the Israel Defense Forces post at the UNDOF crossing gate between the Israeli-occupied Golan and the Syrian Arab Republic.

4. The Force continued to assist the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) with the passage of persons through the area of separation. During the past six months, UNDOF assisted in the crossing of 28 students and two farmers, and provided protection at two weddings. In cooperation with ICRC, UNDOF also coordinated the transfer of 4,500 tons of apples through the area of separation from the Israeli side to the Syrian side. Within the means available, medical treatment was provided to the local population upon request.

5. In the area of operation, especially in the area of separation, mines continued to pose a threat to UNDOF personnel and local inhabitants. Owing to the age of the

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mines and their deteriorating explosives, this threat has increased. UNDOF continued to carry out operational mine clearance. At the request of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, UNDOF supervised demining work carried out by a Syrian civilian demining company in the villages of Al Hamidiyah and Abu Khayt in the area of separation. UNDOF remained available to support the United Nations Children's Fund in activities to promote mine awareness among the civilian population.

6. The Force Commander and his staff maintained close contact with the military authorities of Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic. Both sides generally cooperated with the Force in the execution of its tasks.

7. During the reporting period, the Canadian logistics support element was withdrawn and replaced by a contingent from India. As at 1 June 2006, UNDOF comprised 1,047 troops, from Austria (375), Canada (4), India (187), Japan (30), Nepal (2), Poland (354) and Slovakia (95). A total of 15 personnel were employed by Japan as a national support element. In addition, 79 military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) assisted the Force in carrying out its tasks. All components of the three-year modernization programme of UNDOF facilities have been completed. A map showing the deployment of the Force is attached to the present report.

III. Financial aspects

8. By its resolution 59/306 of 22 June 2005, the General Assembly appropriated the amount of $41.5 million, equivalent to $3.5 million per month, for the maintenance of the Force for the period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006. Should the Council decide to extend the mandate of the Force beyond 30 June 2006, as recommended in paragraph 13 below, the cost of maintaining the Force will be limited to the amounts approved by the General Assembly.

9. As at 30 April 2006, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNDOF special account for the period from the inception of the Force to 31 January 2006 amounted to $33.8 million. Total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at the same date amounted to $2,664.4 million. As at 30 April 2006, amounts owed to troop contributors totalled $3.6 million. Reimbursement of troop and contingent-owned equipment costs have been made for the periods up to 31 January 2006 and 31 December 2005, respectively, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

IV. Implementation of Security Council resolution 338 (1973)

10. The Security Council, when deciding in its resolution 1648 (2005) to renew the mandate of UNDOF for a further period of six months, until 30 June 2006, also called upon the parties concerned to implement immediately its resolution 338 (1973), and requested the Secretary-General to submit, at the end of the period, a report on developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement that resolution. The search for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, and in particular the efforts undertaken at various levels to implement resolution 338 (1973), was dealt with in the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Middle East (A/60/258) submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 59/32 and 59/33.

V. Observations

11. The situation in the Israel-Syria sector has remained generally quiet. UNDOF, which was established in May 1974 to supervise the ceasefire called for by the Security Council and the agreement on disengagement between Syrian and Israeli forces of 31 May 1974, has continued to perform its function effectively, with the cooperation of the parties.

12. Nevertheless, the situation in the Middle East is very tense and is likely to remain so, unless and until a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the Middle East problem can be reached. I hope that determined efforts will be made by all concerned to tackle the problem in all its aspects, with a view to arriving at a just and durable peace settlement, as called for by the Security Council in its resolution 338 (1973).

13. Under the prevailing circumstances, I consider the continued presence of UNDOF in the area to be essential. I therefore recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of the Force for a further period of six months, until 31 December 2006. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has given its assent to the proposed extension. The Government of Israel has also expressed its agreement.

14. In making this recommendation, I must draw attention to the shortfall in the funding of the Force. At present, unpaid assessments amount to some $33.8 million. The sum represents money owed to the Member States that contribute the troops who make up the Force. I appeal to all Member States to pay their assessments promptly and in full and to clear all remaining arrears.

15. In conclusion, I wish to pay tribute to Lieutenant General Bala Nanda Sharma and to the men and women serving with UNDOF. They have performed with efficiency and devotion to duty the important tasks assigned to them by the Security Council. I take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the Governments contributing troops to UNDOF and to those that provide the UNTSO military observers assigned to the Force.


وزع قوة الأمم المتحدة لمراقبة فض الاشتباك في حزيران/يونيه ٢٠٠٦
2006 年 6 月观察员部队的部署
UNDOF DEPLOYMENT AS OF JUNE 2006
DÉPLOIEMENT DE LA FNUOD AU MOIS DE JUIN 2006
ДИСЛОКАЦИЯ СООННР ПО СОСТОЯНИЮ НА ИЮНЬ 2006
DESPLIEGUE DE LA FNUOS EN JUNIO 2006
LEBANON
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
GOLAN HEIGHTS
JORDAN
HQ UNDOF
AUSTRIA / SLOVAKIA
LOG INDIA / JAPAN
HQ COG
MP "B"
STS AUSTRIA / SLOVAKIA
AUSBATT
Camp Faouar
STS POLAND
POLAND
LOG INDIA / JAPAN
Camp Ziouani
MP "A"
MP "C"
POLBATT
Line "Alpha"
Line "Alpha 1"
Line "Bravo"
United Nations observation post
Poste d'observation de l'ONU
Наблюдательный пункт ООН
Puesto de observación de las Naciones Unidas
United Nations position
Position de l'ONU
Позиция ООН
Posicion de las Naciones Unidas
Inter-battalion boundary
Limite entre des bataillons de la Force
Разделительная линия между батальонами
Limites entre batallones de la Feurza
PALESTINE BELT GRID
The designations employed and the presentation of material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.
Map No. 2916 Rev. 61 UNITED NATIONS
June 2006
Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Cartographic Section

United Nations S/2006/334

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 May 2006
English
Original: French

Letter dated 25 May 2006 addressed to the President of the Security Council from the Secretary-General

I have the honour to refer to my letter dated 22 March 2006 (S/2006/184) concerning the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI). In that connection, I wish to follow up on my reports to the Security Council on UNOCI dated 3 January 2006 (S/2006/2) and 11 April 2006 (S/2006/222), in which I recommended that the Council should approve an increase in the Operation's strength by four battalions, three formed police units and 100 police officers in order to enhance the Operation's capacity to protect itself and effectively to support the implementation of the tasks provided for under the peace agreements, which are critical to the organization of the elections in October 2006.

In its resolution 1667 (2006) of 31 March 2006, the Security Council took note of my letter of 22 March and expressed its determination to review the tasks and troop levels of UNOCI by the end of April 2006, with a view to a decision on its reinforcement. In the same resolution, the Council reaffirmed its intention to authorize me to redeploy troops between the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and UNOCI on a temporary basis in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1609 (2005), as might be needed. I have noted with satisfaction the support expressed for my recommendations by most members of the Council during their recent consultations on Côte d'Ivoire, and I am aware that the Council remains actively seized of the matter.

In this regard, I wish to bring to the attention of the Security Council the latest developments in Côte d'Ivoire, which call for the urgent reinforcement of UNOCI to the levels indicated in my above-mentioned reports. On 18 May last, the Prime Minister, Charles Konan Banny, launched on a trial basis the delicate process of identification of the populations in seven zones spread across the territory of Côte d'Ivoire. The arrangements for the pre-regroupment of the troops of the Forces nouvelles and the Forces armeés nationales de Côte d'Ivoire should be finalized shortly. The "pilot project", which began on 18 May, should lead to the implementation throughout the national territory of Côte d'Ivoire of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme as well as to the identification of populations and preparation of electoral lists.

In the light of these important developments and given the very short period remaining before the date set for the elections, it is crucial for UNOCI to be adequately reinforced in a timely manner, to enable it effectively to fulfil its mandate in support of the delicate processes of identification and disarmament. I

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therefore appeal to the Security Council to expedite its decision on the recommendations for the strengthening of UNOCI.

I should be grateful if you would bring this letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kofi A. **Annan**

United Nations S/2006/335

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 May 2006

Original: English

Letter dated 24 May 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to draw your attention to the statement regarding the referendum in Montenegro, issued on 23 May 2006 by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Gerhard **Pfanzelter**
Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations

06-36453 (E) 010606

Annex to the letter dated 24 May 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: English, French and Spanish]

Statement regarding the referendum in Montenegro issued on 23 May 2006 by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union

The European Union welcomes the successful organization of the referendum on the independence of Montenegro. The European Union notes the assessment of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights that the referendum was conducted overall in line with OSCE and Council of Europe commitments and other international standards for democratic electoral processes. The conduct of the referendum was a sign of the maturity of the political forces and people of Montenegro.

The European Union calls on all sides concerned to accept the result. For its part, it will fully respect the decision of the people of Montenegro.

The European Union calls on Belgrade and Podgorica to take up, as rapidly as possible, a direct dialogue on the way ahead. The European Union stands ready to support this dialogue.

The European Union reconfirms the European perspective of the Western Balkans on the basis of the stabilization and association process.

The acceding countries Bulgaria and Romania, the candidate countries Croatia,* the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* and Turkey, the countries of the stabilization and association process and potential candidates Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the EFTA countries Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, align themselves with this statement.

* Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia continue to be part of the stabilization and association process.

United Nations A/ES-10/334–S/2006/336

General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Sixty-first year

Identical letters dated 25 May 2006 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I am writing in reference to the letter dated 5 May 2006 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations (A/ES-10/330-S/2006/279) in which he provides names of "martyrs" killed by "Israeli occupying forces".

Our recent experience has revealed that all too often those referred to as Palestinian "martyrs" were actually terrorists on their way to perpetrate suicide bombing attacks, fire Qassam rockets or carry out other forms of brutal terrorism. Without referencing the entire list in the Permanent Observer's letter, allow me, for matters of clarification, to point out one inaccuracy.

Contrary to the letter, Thamer Al-Macheharawi and Khaled Said Sanouna were Palestinian police officers, killed on Tuesday, 2 May 2005, by a stray Qassam rocket, intended for Israeli citizens, which was fired by Palestinian terrorists.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Daniel **Carmon**
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

06-36471 (E) 260506

United Nations S/2006/337

Security Council

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26 May 2006

Original: English

Letter dated 26 May 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Further to the letter sent by my Foreign Minister to the Secretary-General dated 24 May 2006 (S/2006/326) and following the presidential statement of the Security Council of 25 May (S/PRST/2006/25), I am writing to inform you that the Portuguese Government has decided to initiate the deployment of a gendarmerie force in response to the formal written request from the authorities of Timor-Leste on 24 May.

We will continue to cooperate closely with Timor-Leste authorities and the other Governments concerned, as well as with the United Nations, both in New York and on the ground, with the objective of contributing to the restoration and maintenance of security in Timor-Leste.

We are conveying this information separately to the Secretary-General. I would be grateful if you would circulate the present letter as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) João **Salgueiro**
Permanent Representative

06-36488 (E) 260506

United Nations S 2006/338

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 May 2006

Original: English

Letter dated 26 May 2006 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to my letter of 24 May 2006 (S/2006/319) conveying a letter from the Government of Timor-Leste, which drew my attention to the deteriorating internal security conditions in Timor-Leste and informed me that the Governments of Australia, New Zealand, Portugal and Malaysia had been requested to send defence and security forces to Timor-Leste as a matter of urgency.

Regrettably, the situation has continued to worsen, with reports indicating the deaths on 25 May of nine members of the Timorese police (PNTL) and injuries to almost 30 others, including two United Nations police advisers, as a result of gunshot wounds following an attack on PNTL headquarters. There have also been reports of gunshots heard during the day throughout the capital, Dili, and in the surrounding hills.

I contacted the President of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão, and Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri by telephone yesterday. I expressed my deep concern over recent events and signalled the readiness of the United Nations to assist in facilitating negotiations to resolve the current crisis. In view of the deteriorating security situation and the complex political situation, with the concurrence of the Timorese leaders, I have requested Ian Martin, who served during 1999 as my Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor, to travel to Timor-Leste to assess the situation, working closely with the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste and the Timorese leadership.

I have also spoken with the Prime Ministers of Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Portugal, who conveyed their commitment to send defence and security forces to Timor-Leste in response to the Government's request. I welcomed this action on their part.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kofi A. **Annan**

06-36494 (E) 260506

United Nations S/2006/339

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 May 2006
English
Original: French

Letter dated 23 May 2006 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), in which the Council requests me, in consultation with the Executive Chairman and the Council members, to appoint suitably qualified experts as a College of Commissioners for the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission.

Mr. Stephen G. Rademaker has informed me of his resignation from the College of Commissioners. It is my intention to appoint Mr. Francis C. Record to that post.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kofi **Annan**

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United Nations S/2006/340

Security Council

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30 May 2006
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Original: French

Letter dated 26 May 2006 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that the letter dated 23 May 2006 (S/2006/339), whereby you announce your intention to appoint Mr. Francis C. Record to the post of commissioner of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council, who have taken note of the intention expressed in your letter.

(*Signed*) Basile **Ikouebe**
President of the Security Council

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Security Council

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Letter dated 26 May 2006 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that the members of the Security Council have decided to send a mission to the Sudan and Chad from 4 to 10 June 2006. The mission will be led by Ambassador Jones Parry of the United Kingdom. The members of the Council have agreed on the terms of reference of the mission, which are annexed hereto.

Following consultations with the members, it has been agreed that the composition of the mission is as follows:

Ambassador Emyr Jones Parry (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), head of mission

Ambassador César Mayoral (Argentina)

Ambassador Wang Guangya (China)

Ambassador Basile Ikouebe (Congo)

Ambassador Lars Faaborg-Andersen (Denmark)

Ambassador Jean-Marc de La Sablière (France)

Ambassador Nana Effah-Apenteng (Ghana)

Ambassador Adamantios Th. Vassilakis (Greece)

Ambassador Shinichi Kitaoka (Japan)

Ambassador Oswaldo De Rivero (Peru)

Minister Jamal Nasser Al-Bader (Qatar)

Minister Konstantin Dolgov (Russian Federation)

Ambassador Peter Burian (Slovakia)

Ambassador Augustine P. Mahiga (United Republic of Tanzania)

Ambassador Jackie Wolcott Sanders (United States of America)

I should be grateful if you could have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Basile **Ikouebe**
President of Security Council

06-36624 (E) 300506

Annex

Security Council mission to the Sudan, Chad and the African Union Headquarters in Addis Ababa

General

- Demonstrate the Security Council's determination to work with the Government of the Sudan, the African Union and other parties to assist in tackling the various problems confronting the Sudan.
- Express the Security Council's utmost concern over the dire consequences of the prolonged conflict in Darfur for the civilian population, including the continuing humanitarian crisis, and the repercussions for the rest of the Sudan and the region; and reiterate in the strongest terms the need for all parties to the conflict to put an end to violence and atrocities.
- Reiterate the Security Council's commitment to the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of the Sudan, which will be unaffected by the transition to a United Nations operation in Darfur.
- Raise global public awareness of the crisis in Darfur, as well as the efforts of the United Nations, and the Security Council, to tackle it.
- Reiterate the Security Council's welcome of the success of the African Union-led inter-Sudanese peace talks on the conflict in Darfur in Abuja, Nigeria, in particular the framework agreed between the parties for a resolution of the conflict in Darfur (the Darfur Peace Agreement).
- Stress the importance of full and rapid implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement to restore a sustainable peace in Darfur.
- Call on the parties to the Department of Political Affairs to respect their commitments and implement the agreement without delay.
- Urge those parties that have not signed the Department of Political Affairs to do so without delay and not to act in any way that would impede implementation of the agreement.
- Expresses the Security Council's intention to take, including in response to a request by the African Union, strong and effective measures, such as an asset freeze or travel ban, against any individual or group that violates or attempts to block the implementation of the Department of Political Affairs or commits human rights violations.
- Stress the importance of launching the Darfur-Darfur dialogue as soon as possible with a wide range of stakeholders, in order to explain the Department of Political Affairs and enlist wider support for it.
- Call on all relevant parties to take all necessary measures to ensure the continued effectiveness of the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) so that AMIS can support implementation of the Department of Political Affairs.
- Reiterate support for a transition to a United Nations operation as soon as possible, in the interests of the safety and security of the people of Darfur.

- Express the Security Council's support for the decision of the African Union Peace and Security Commission on 15 May 2006 that concrete steps should be taken to effect the transition from AMIS to a United Nations operation.
- Call on the parties to the Department of Political Affairs to facilitate and work with the African Union, the United Nations, regional and international organizations and Member States to accelerate transition to a United Nations operation.
- Look actively at ways to immediately further enhance cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union, with a view to transition to a United Nations operation.
- Make clear the Security Council's view that a United Nations operation should have strong African participation and character.
- Reaffirm the Security Council's concern that the persisting violence in Darfur might further negatively affect the rest of the Sudan as well as the region, including the security of Chad and the Central African Republic.
- Call on all States in the region to cooperate in ensuring regional stability.
- Stress that the Secretary-General should consult jointly with the African Union, in close and continuing consultation with the Security Council, and in cooperation and close consultation with the parties to the Abuja peace talks, including the Government of National Unity, on decisions concerning the transition to a United Nations operation.

Sudan: Darfur issues

- Make clear to the Government of the Sudan the benefits of a United Nations mission in Darfur.
- Evaluate the additional support required for AMIS to be able to protect civilians and meet its mission objectives.
- Assess the further additional strengthening AMIS requires to implement the Department of Political Affairs.
- Call on all parties to respect the neutrality, impartiality and independence of humanitarian assistance, and insist on compliance with international humanitarian law and other relevant international obligations.
- Press all parties, in particular the Government of the Sudan, to ensure full and unimpeded access to non-governmental organizations and humanitarian and relief organizations.
- Assess the looming food crisis in the Sudan and the need for donors to quickly commit new funds to ensure that there is no break in food supply from the World Food Programme.
- Exchange views with non-governmental organizations on how to improve the humanitarian situation.
- Evaluate the extent of gender violence in Darfur, propose recommendations for urgently addressing it and evaluate the progress of the Government of National Unity towards implementing its Action Plan to Combat Violence against

Women in Darfur, with particular focus on the rescission of Form 8 and access to legal redress.

- Reiterate the need for an end to forced depopulation and underline concern at the increasing number of internally displaced persons.
- Support the efforts of humanitarian and relief agencies in Darfur.
- Evaluate the enforcement and impact of existing Security Council provisions, including targeted sanctions and the arms embargo on Darfur.
- Press for the Government of the Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur, in accordance with their obligations under resolution 1593 (2005), to cooperate fully with the International Criminal Court.

Sudan: North-South and southern Sudan issues

- Review progress in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the creation of the institutions of Southern Sudan, emphasizing the importance that all parties honour the agreements.
- Assess the performance and operational capacity of UNMIS.
- Assess in accordance with resolution 1663 (2006) how UNMIS could more effectively address the problem of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which continues to cause the death, abduction and displacement of many innocent civilians in the Sudan and elsewhere.
- Reaffirm the Security Council's concern about LRA and press for urgent action by the Sudanese authorities to arrest those subject to arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court.

African Union (Addis Ababa)

- Exchange of views on how best to launch the Darfur-Darfur dialogue.
- Commend the efforts of the African Union to achieve lasting peace in Darfur, including what AMIS has successfully achieved as well as the efforts of Member States and organizations that have assisted AMIS.
- Reiterate the Security Council's endorsement of the decision of the African Union Peace and Security Council of 10 March to support in principle the transition of AMIS to a United Nations operation.
- Call on the African Union to agree with the United Nations, regional and international organizations, and Member States on requirements now necessary, in addition to those identified by the Joint Assessment Mission of December 2005, to strengthen the capacity of AMIS to enforce the security arrangements of the Department of Political Affairs, with a view to a follow-on United Nations operation in Darfur.
- Welcome, and stress the importance of, the increasing cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union to facilitate transition from AMIS to a United Nations operation.

- Press for, and assess progress towards, the early convening of a pledging conference, making clear that additional funds for AMIS will depend on the development of a realistic plan to reinforce AMIS.
- Exchange views on the threat from the Lords Resistance Army and ongoing efforts to resolve this problem.
- Exchange views on African Union efforts to address the crisis in Chad and to restore peace and stability in the region.
- Develop closer relations between the United Nations and the African Union.
- Exchange views on enhancing the ability of AMIS to protect civilians, including through the conduct of patrols 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, outside of camps of internally displaced persons.

Sudan-Chad relations

- Encourage the reduction of tensions between Chad and the Sudan.
- Stress the importance of maintaining the security and neutrality of the internally displaced person/refugee camps in the Sudan and Chad.
- Express concern over, and explore a resolution to, the conflict between Chad and the Sudan, making clear that both Chad and the Sudan must refrain from any actions in violation of the integrity of their common border, and ensure that their territory is not used to destabilize the territory of others.
- Call on Chad and the Sudan to abide by their obligations under the Tripoli Declaration and Agreement of 8 February 2006, and to implement agreed confidence-building measures.
- Evaluate the implications of the conflict in Darfur on Chad, and the ways to address the problems arising, including the refugee camps, recruitment of child soldiers, border security and wider regional stability.
- Assess the impact of the closure of the border between Chad and the Sudan on the operation of United Nations humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations.

Chad

- Evaluate the situation of the refugees from the Sudan and from the Central African Republic, as well as of the internally displaced persons in Chad.
- Make clear that any attempt to seize power by force would be regarded by the Security Council as unacceptable, and call on all parties in Chad to renounce violence.
- Evaluate the impact of the rebel attacks perpetrated recently against N'Djamena and Adré.
- Call for open and sustained political dialogue with those parties in Chad that are willing to renounce violence.
- Support the efforts of humanitarian and relief agencies in Chad, in accordance with international humanitarian law.

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Security Council

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30 May 2006

Original: English

United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Security Council the twenty-fifth quarterly report on the activities of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). It is submitted by the Acting Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999).

06-35265 (E) 310506

Twenty-fifth quarterly report on the activities of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999)

I. Introduction

1. The present report, which is the twenty-fifth submitted in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), covers the activities of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) during the period from 1 March to 31 May 2006.

II. Developments

2. During the period under review, the Acting Executive Chairman has continued the practice of briefing the respective Presidents of the Security Council, representatives of Member States and officials of the Secretariat on the activities of UNMOVIC.

3. In the reporting period the Acting Executive Chairman visited Brussels for a meeting with the Personal Representative, Annalisa Giannella, of the High Representative on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction of the European Union. Dorothea Auer, Head of the Department for Disarmament and Arms Control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Austria, which has the current Presidency of the European Union, also attended.

Compendium

4. The summary of the compendium has been completed. In accordance with the recommendation of the College of Commissioners at its twenty-second session, the Commission is seeking to have the summary made available as a report to the Security Council (see S/2006/133, para. 21), after additional comments received from the Commissioners have been taken into account.

Archives

5. UNMOVIC experts continue to review the Commission's substantive records to identify issues that will need to be addressed should those records eventually be transferred to the United Nations archives. Legal and technical experts are also continuing to study the information provided to UNMOVIC officials following expert briefings arranged by Commissioners in their countries concerning relevant national legislation and practices. Further comments are expected to be received from Commissioners after their consultations with national experts on the contents of the working paper on this matter, provided to them in February and discussed during the twenty-second session of the College.

III. Other activities

6. On 7 April, the Permanent Representative of Iraq wrote to the Acting Executive Chairman stating that the Government of Iraq intended to accede to the

Chemical Weapons Convention. Accordingly, it requested that UNMOVIC provide to the Government of Iraq the full, final and complete disclosure relating to chemical weapons that was provided by the National Monitoring Directorate of Iraq to the United Nations Special Commission in 1996. On 10 April the Acting Executive Chairman informed the President of the Council that UNMOVIC had repeatedly indicated to the Security Council its readiness to respond to any request for assistance by Iraq on such matters. Accordingly, he proposed to provide Iraq with the document duly redacted for proliferation-sensitive content. On 24 May the President of the Council replied, stating that the members of the Security Council suggested that the Acting Executive Chairman provide the Government of Iraq with the relevant sections of the "Currently accurate, full and complete declaration", transmitted by the National Monitoring Directorate in December 2002 and circulated to the Security Council, which is an updated document, having due regard to issues related to the disposition of proliferation-sensitive documents and materials. UNMOVIC transmitted the relevant sections in electronic format to the Permanent Representative of Iraq on 30 May.

7. In the light of the above-mentioned request and Iraq's stated intention to accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Commission deems it appropriate to add to this report an annex which provides an overview of the chemical weapon programme of Iraq (see annex).

IV. Other issues

Field offices

8. On 1 March 2006, two international staff members from the Cyprus field office travelled to Baghdad to redeploy all assets from the United Nations Canal compound. With considerable assistance from the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), the Canal compound was completely cleared of UNMOVIC equipment by 25 March, all equipment being redeployed to either the international zone in Baghdad, the United Nations Kheitan compound in Kuwait for decisions as to future disposal, or Cyprus for refurbishment and storage. In addition, some equipment requested by IAEA was recovered to Cyprus where it was trans-shipped to Vienna by IAEA staff. Sufficient office equipment was redeployed to the international zone to support a team of inspectors in the event that they are required to operate from there. The 40-foot mobile chemical laboratory was also redeployed to the international zone together with its generator as well as its collection of all inert weapons of mass destruction artefacts. A large number of assets whose disposal had earlier been approved by the Headquarters Property Survey Board were left in situ at the Canal compound and handed over as donations to the Government of Iraq. The items included 23 soft-sided vehicles including three new ambulances, vehicle spare parts, information technology equipment and furniture. UNMOVIC is grateful to UNAMI for the assistance provided.

9. A tentative agreement was reached for the co-location of UNMOVIC local staff with UNAMI to maintain the Commission's equipment in the international zone. The Baghdad local staff is to be reduced from seven to two after 30 June 2006.

10. The Cyprus field office continues to maintain the equipment stored in Cyprus as well as provide day-to-day supervision of the Baghdad local staff. Whenever

appropriate, the staff of the field office has continued to work with Customs in Larnaca facilitating the shipments of other United Nations agencies. The field office also continues to support UNFICYP whenever it is requested to do so.

Staffing

11. At the end of May 2006, UNMOVIC headquarters core staff at the Professional level totalled 37. The staff is drawn from 21 nationalities; eight are women.

Technical visits, meetings and workshops

12. UNMOVIC continues to follow dual-use technology and related developments and assess the implications for its mandate and the potential application of new technologies in detection, monitoring and verification.

13. An UNMOVIC expert attended the 231st national meeting and exposition of the American Chemical Society in Atlanta, United States, from 26 to 30 March 2006. The scientific programme included some 8,000 oral and poster presentations and the exposition attracted more than 300 exhibiting companies. The most relevant items to the UNMOVIC monitoring mandate were biosensors and spectral methods, such as mass spectrometry and Raman spectrometry, in combination with various chromatography and immunological methods.

14. UNMOVIC experts attended the INTERPHEX 2006 exhibition in March in New York City. The exhibition covered advanced technologies in pharmaceutical manufacturing and issues from process development to quality control, packaging and validation. At the exhibit, staff were allowed a close evaluation of new equipment for production, mixing, grinding and filtration, many of which are dual-use equipment under the ongoing monitoring and verification plan and import/export notification list.

15. In April, UNMOVIC hosted a seminar — at no cost to the Organization — related to new tagging and monitoring technologies. A presentation by a United States manufacturer demonstrated how the application of radio frequency identification tags provides greater accuracy for inventory and control. Such tags and labels encompass a technology used to identify, track and locate assets coupled with network architecture to drive the development of an electronic product code that can be remotely monitored. The seminar covered both specific radio frequency identification hardware and software aspects of identification, tagging and monitoring.

16. Also in April, UNMOVIC hosted a seminar — at no cost to the Organization — on environmental sampling for the collection and analysis of biological material. The latest update included air-sampling advances and their integration into the DNA monitoring and analysis system previously deployed by UNMOVIC. New compact, easy-to-use, lightweight and less contamination-prone instruments are now available for DNA analysis. The staff had a hands-on session with the new DNA equipment.

17. Two UNMOVIC experts attended the 2006 Chemical Weapons Demilitarization Conference in Luneburg, Germany, from 15 to 18 May. This annual conference addresses technical problems associated with chemical weapon disposal under the requirements of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The latest

developments in chemical analysis of chemical weapon agents, procedures on the safe handling of non-stockpiled munitions, and issues concerning the redirection of former chemical weapon scientists were presented.

Training

18. UNMOVIC conducted a biological training course in Brazil from 6 to 15 March 2006. Fifteen experts from the UNMOVIC roster from 14 countries and one UNMOVIC staff member attended the course as trainees. Like a previous course in Argentina on missiles, this course was also a technology course. The main objectives were (a) to develop a good technical understanding on the part of the trainees of the technologies used in the production of human vaccines and (b) to improve trainees' skills in designing inspection and monitoring regimes for biological production facilities. This was the third technology course in the biological area, all of which were conducted in Brazil. The Commission is grateful to the Government of Brazil for its support for UNMOVIC training activities.

19. Since the completion of the recent course in Brazil, UNMOVIC has increased the number of specialist international experts who have unique skills in establishing inspection and monitoring procedures to detect or deter the production of biological warfare agents at dual-use facilities. The course also demonstrated that declared biological production facilities could be monitored effectively and efficiently through a non-intrusive regime based on a combination of targeted sampling, focused application of sensors and infrequent inspections conducted by teams of experienced and well-trained experts. Such a regime would not have an adverse impact on legitimate activities at a site and would not be burdensome either for a host country or for the inspection agency.

20. The course in Brazil was the thirty-fourth UNMOVIC training course. The next training course, on technologies used in missile guidance and control systems and in the production of drones, cruise missiles and other unmanned aerial vehicles, started in France on 29 May.

21. UNMOVIC has undertaken an update of its roster of inspectors. Beyond the current staff members, over 300 persons on the roster have confirmed their willingness to participate in inspection missions if called upon by UNMOVIC.

V. College of Commissioners

22. On 19 May, Stephen G. Rademaker (United States) resigned from the College of Commissioners. The Secretary-General appointed Francis C. Record (United States) as his successor.

23. The UNMOVIC College of Commissioners convened in New York for its twenty-third session on 23 and 24 May. Observers from the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons attended.

24. The Acting Executive Chairman briefed the Commissioners on the activities of UNMOVIC since their last session and on the planned activities for the next quarter. In addition, presentations were made on:

(a) A comparison of the requirements for chemical weapon-related declarations under Security Council resolutions and under the Chemical Weapons Convention;

(b) United Nations verification: weapons of mass destruction in Iraq — a presentation made by UNMOVIC in January to the panel of government experts established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 59/60.[1]

25. The College welcomed the Acting Executive Chairman's introductory statement and the two presentations.

26. The College discussed the summary of the Compendium that had been revised in the light of earlier comments by Commissioners. The revised summary was widely commended. Commissioners have submitted additional comments that have been taken into account. The Commissioners felt that the necessary steps should be taken to seek the release of the summary as an UNMOVIC report to the Council, and urged that its release should not be unduly delayed.

27. It was tentatively decided to hold the next session of the College on 22 and 23 August 2006.

28. In accordance with paragraph 5 of resolution 1284 (1999), the Commissioners were consulted on the content of the present report.

[1] Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification.

Annex

Overview of the chemical weapon programme of Iraq

1. Chemical weapons were the first area of weapons of mass destruction explored by Iraq. In 1971, the Iraqi Chemical Corps established a laboratory-scale facility at Al-Rashad, in the Baghdad area, to gain practical experience in the synthesis of chemical warfare agents and to evaluate their effects. Although production of laboratory (gram to kilogram) quantities of chemical warfare agents could have been justified for defensive purposes, such as the calibration of detection instruments and the testing of protective equipment, the work of the laboratory also constituted a necessary step in the training of a national cadre for future dedicated chemical weapon research and production. In addition, it contributed to the creation of relevant support infrastructure and a system for the acquisition of equipment and materials.

2. The functioning of a laboratory in the period from 1971 to 1973 can be considered to be a preparatory stage of Iraqi familiarization with chemical weapon technology, although there is no clear evidence concerning the intentions of Iraq at that time. In 1974, the laboratory came under the auspices of a newly created organization, the Al-Hazen ibn al-Haitham Institute, which was subordinated to the Iraqi security and intelligence agencies.

3. By the end of 1974, the chemical weapon work at the Al-Hazen ibn al-Haitham Institute was expanded in an attempt to produce chemical warfare agents on a larger (tens of kilograms) scale. Following the progress in the scaling-up of the synthesis of chemical warfare agents, the Al-Hazen ibn al-Haitham Institute decided to expand its chemical laboratory complex inherited from the Chemical Corps and to place larger-scale production units at a new site located in a remote desert area south of the town of Samarra. In 1975, the construction of four production plants commenced. These included a plant for the production of the chemical warfare agent mustard gas, a plant to manufacture the nerve agents tabun and sarin, and two multipurpose plants for the production of precursor chemicals. The construction work stopped however after the closure of the Al-Hazen ibn al-Haitham Institute in 1978.

4. A large-scale chemical weapons programme was established by Iraq in 1981, after the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war, when Iraq faced defeat in the face of the overwhelming manpower advantage of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The goal was to produce and supply the armed forces with significant quantities of chemical weapons that could be quickly deployed.

5. The Iraqi military chemical weapon programme progressed rapidly. From 1981 to 1983, Iraq expanded production at the Al-Rashad facility and developed the complex at the Samarra site started by the Al-Hazen ibn al-Haitham Institute. Iraq constructed several chemical weapon production plants and assembled other critical elements of infrastructure at the site. By the end of 1984, Iraq had produced hundreds of tons of chemical warfare agents and supplied several thousand filled chemical weapon munitions to the armed forces. Iraq was not able to transcend some critical technological barriers, such as the quality of some of the chemical warfare agents produced. Despite those flaws, however, according to Iraq, the use of chemical weapons achieved its major purpose and made a significant impact on the outcome of the Iran-Iraq war.

6. The chemical weapon programme required access to foreign technology, equipment and raw materials because, in the early 1980s, Iraq did not have indigenous capabilities to manufacture chemical process equipment and precursors for the production of chemical warfare agents. A convincing legitimate cover story was needed to engage outside contractors and suppliers. Therefore, the chemical weapon programme began to operate under the facade of the State Establishment for Pesticide Production (SEPP).

7. In the 1970s and 1980s, the production of a second generation of agricultural pesticides, in terms of technology, equipment and raw materials, most closely corresponded to the requirements for the production of chemical warfare agents. In addition, Iraq had legitimate needs for pesticides for its growing agricultural sector.

8. In general, Iraq did not develop its own methods for the production of chemical warfare agents. At the beginning of the programme, its main concept was to replicate, at an industrial scale, known foreign methods and techniques of the production of chemical warfare agents using commercially available technology, equipment and raw materials. Later, however, for some agents, such as VX, Iraq applied modified processes to suit its own capabilities.

9. Training in foreign institutions, open publications, foreign patents, international conferences and forums were major sources of information on basic chemical weapon production technology for Iraq. The information was first tested by Iraq at laboratory level to identify and adjust unknown parameters of the synthesis of chemical warfare agents that could not be found in open sources, such as the kinetics of chemical reactions, combinations of catalysts, equipment specifications and scaling-up procedures.

10. During the Iran-Iraq war, the Iraqi chemical weapon programme was not able to produce weapons of sufficient quality that could be stored as operational and strategic reserves. To overcome this limitation, after the end of the war, the chemical weapon programme was focused on the improvement of previously produced agents and on the development of more powerful agents and better quality agents suitable for long-term storage. Those activities included efforts to produce binary weapons and the chemical warfare agent VX. Iraq also initiated several projects to build indigenous capabilities for the production of critical chemical warfare agent precursors after 1988. These efforts were interrupted by the 1991 Gulf war.

11. According to declarations made by Iraq, in the period from 1981 to 1991 the chemical weapon programme produced approximately 3,850 tons of the chemical warfare agents mustard, tabun, sarin and VX, as shown in figure I.

Figure I: Production of lethal chemical warfare agents as declared by Iraq*



	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1990
VX								2.4	1.5
Sarin				5	30	40	209	394	117
Tabun				60	70	80			
Mustard	10	75	150	240	350	350	899	494	280

* Iraq declared no large-scale production or weaponization for 1989.

Weaponization of chemical warfare agents

12. The chemical warfare agent weaponization efforts conducted by SEPP and the Muthanna State Establishment (MSE) relied mainly on the adaptation of conventional munitions for the dispersion of chemical warfare agents. In most cases, the adaptations were performed by or coordinated with other Iraqi military industrial establishments. The critical components that made those munitions technically suitable for chemical weapon applications were optimized burster charges of specific size and shape and other minor components, such as sealing rings, filling ports and agent containers.

13. In order to achieve self-reliance in munitions, the Iraqi chemical weapon programme also indigenously produced munitions casings, including a variety of aerial bombs, using raw materials for the production of conventional munitions and manufacturing equipment procured from foreign suppliers. The production of chemical weapon munitions was directly linked to the design and production of conventional munitions by Iraq.

14. Sustainable means of delivery and munitions capable of fulfilling operational goals was the prime determining factor in the selection of munitions for the Iraqi chemical weapon programme. The efficiency of dissemination of chemical warfare agents for munitions was considered by Iraq in relation to operational goals. However, the optimal efficiency of munitions was not in itself the prime criterion for the selection of munitions for use with a chemical warfare agent.

15. In the methods and "rules" of chemical weapon use, Iraq followed known principles. Battle scenarios prepared by the Iraqi armed forces envisaged both defensive and offensive operations and therefore comprised requirements for different types of chemical munitions to assure operational flexibility. Thus, in general, artillery projectiles and aerial bombs filled with the persistent chemical warfare agent mustard gas were to be used for area denial, to prevent the movement of attacking enemy troops in the course of defensive operations. Chemical 122-mm rockets filled with the non-persistent chemical warfare agent sarin were to be deployed against enemy positions on the front line, and used to break the enemy defences in preparation for offensive operations and counter-attacks. After chemical attacks, areas fired upon with chemical rockets containing non-persistent agent could be crossed by attacking Iraqi troops. Aerial bombs with both persistent and non-persistent agents could be used against multiple targets beyond the front line. Chemical warheads for ballistic missiles developed at the very end of the programme were considered to be strategic weapons.

16. Iraq did not have special military units dedicated for the use of chemical weapons. Regular military combat units were to receive and use chemical weapons if necessary, under special directives. It is probable that such directives were issued during the Iran-Iraq war under the name of the President of Iraq.

17. Of the total of some 3,850 tons of chemical warfare agents produced, approximately 3,300 tons of agents were weaponized in different types of aerial bombs, artillery munitions and missile warheads, as detailed in figure II.

Figure II: Weaponization of lethal chemical warfare agents as declared by Iraq*



Tons of chemical warfare agents weaponized	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1990
Artillery munitions and missile warheads	10	27	61	32	243	110	123
Aerial bombs	53	220	284	292	931	807	126

* Iraq declared no large-scale production or weaponization for 1989. It produced an unknown (probably small) number of weapons in 1981 and 1982.

18. In the period from 1981 to 1991, Iraq weaponized some 130,000 chemical munitions in total. Of these, over 101,000 munitions were used in combat, according to Iraq, in the period from 1981 to 1988.

19. Iraq declared that some 28,500 chemical munitions remained unused in Iraq as of January 1991. According to Iraq, of these, about 5,500 filled munitions were destroyed by coalition forces during the war in 1991. Another 500 filled munitions were declared destroyed unilaterally by Iraq. These last two figures were partially verified by United Nations inspectors. The bulk of the destruction of some 22,000 filled munitions however occurred under the supervision of the United Nations inspectors in accordance with Security Council resolution 687 (1991) in the period from 1991 to 1994. During the collection of chemical weapons for destruction after the 1991 war, Iraq stated that it was not able to locate some 500 chemical munitions.

Destruction of Iraqi chemical weapons and related items

20. In accordance with Security Council resolution 687 (1991), large quantities of chemical weapons and related items and materials declared by Iraq were destroyed under United Nations supervision in a relatively short period, from 1991 to 1994, mainly at the Muthanna State Establishment, the former chemical weapon complex. The destruction included 22,000 filled and more than 16,000 unfilled chemical munitions, 690 tons of chemical warfare agents (both bulk and weaponized), more

than 3,000 tons of precursor chemicals and over 100 major items of chemical weapon production equipment.

21. The supervision of the destruction by Iraq of its chemical weapons was one of the main achievements of the United Nations verification agency. It was the first chemical weapon destruction operation supervised by an international organization. It demonstrates the fact that, by using the best expertise available and developing optimal operating procedures, the Special Commission was able to ensure that this dangerous operation was conducted as rapidly as possible.

22. The United Nations supervision of the destruction operations was not limited to the presence of the United Nations inspectors at a destruction site and the observation of destruction operations. It also included the evaluation and assessment of the destruction methods proposed by Iraq to meet the requirements of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) regarding public safety during the destruction, as well as technical expertise, guidance and actual support to Iraqi personnel involved in the destruction. To accomplish this, the Special Commission assembled a Destruction Advisory Panel comprising prominent international experts in the area of chemical weapons to consult on all aspects of the destruction. The intended destruction methods were also coordinated with the United Nations Environment Programme.

23. The following methods were used for the destruction of Iraqi chemical weapons and precursor chemicals:

(a) Destruction of the chemical warfare agent mustard gas and flammable precursors using an incinerator built by Iraq from items of equipment procured and used in the past by the chemical weapon programme. The incinerator, at MSE, was commissioned by the United Nations Special Commission;

(b) Destruction of the chemical warfare nerve agents sarin and tabun, and some of their precursors, through hydrolysis using MSE facilities, under the guidance of the Special Commission;

(c) Destruction on an ad hoc basis through explosive venting and simultaneous burning of chemical munitions damaged during the 1991 Gulf war. Those munitions represented immediate health and environmental hazards and for safety considerations could not be transported to the designated destruction site at the former chemical weapon complex.

24. A dedicated Special Commission team, the Chemical Destruction Group, was deployed to Iraq, where it was stationed from 1992 to 1994, to supervise and monitor destruction operations carried out by Iraq, including regular environmental monitoring. It also provided decontamination and medical support to Iraqi personnel involved in the destruction operations. Over 100 experts from 25 countries served with the Group during the period of its work in Iraq. Owing to the dangerous nature of the work and the hazard inherent in the destruction area, utmost attention was given to minimizing the health and environmental impacts of the destruction of chemical weapons and their components. The Group personnel suffered no serious injuries during destruction operations. The final sampling and analysis conducted by the Special Commission upon the completion of the destruction showed that no significant chemical weapons-related environmental hazards existed at MSE.

25. All hazardous waste resulting from the destruction of chemical weapons was safely sealed at several structures and areas of MSE with reinforced concrete and

brick walls covered with earth. These included two bunkers, one of which was damaged by aerial bombardment in 1991 and contained 122-mm artillery rockets and munition remnants that had been filled with nerve agent sarin. To maintain security and safety, in a signed protocol with the Special Commission, Iraq undertook to inspect the sealed structures at least once a month to ensure that the seals were intact and that warning signs are not removed, damaged or defaced as long as Security Council resolution 715 (1991) remains in force.

26. The United Nations-supervised destruction of chemical weapons by Iraq shows the importance of long-term continuity in site security and safety arrangements and hazardous materials disposal. The implementation of the protocol after the withdrawal of the United Nations inspectors from Iraq, in March 2003, cannot be verified.

United Nations verification

27. Although a number of issues relating to the Iraqi chemical weapon programme remain unresolved, the United Nations inspectors were able to identify the major parameters of the programme, its scope and the results achieved. This included elements of the programme that Iraq tried to conceal from the inspectors, such as its efforts to produce the chemical warfare agent VX and retain a portion of the equipment, instruments and materials procured in the past by the chemical weapon programme.

28. The experience of the verification of the Iraqi chemical weapon programme shows that only an advanced verification system comprising various verification tools and techniques is capable of uncovering undeclared activities. The analysis of procurement data revealed the acquisition of specific items and materials by Iraq; document searches resulted in the discovery of records of undeclared activities; interviews with Iraqi scientists and technicians helped to identify gaps in the Iraqi declarations on specific issues; debriefings of defectors produced additional information that was not declared by Iraq; information from former suppliers to Iraq helped to corroborate procurement data; and sampling and analysis identified residues of undeclared materials, which, in combination with on-site inspections, revealed the indisputable existence of undeclared activities. Combined expertise within the United Nations verification body was also critical for credible verification and assessment. In addition, the system of ongoing monitoring and verification provided assurance that chemical weapon production had ended in 1991 and was a strong deterrent to the resumption of proscribed activities thereafter.

29. The primary chemical weapon development and production complex in Iraq was dismantled and closed under the supervision of the United Nations Special Commission. Inspectors identified other facilities with dual-use capabilities that were put under monitoring. Considerable progress was made in the verification of undeclared chemical weapon-related activities, such as the VX production activities of Iraq and its efforts to retain a portion of the chemical process equipment and precursors procured in the past by its chemical weapon programme.

30. On the issue of VX, Iraq initially declared that it had carried out only laboratory research on this chemical warfare agent. By 1995, the Special Commission uncovered evidence that the scope of Iraqi activities on VX was much broader. Consequently, in 1996 Iraq declared the production of 3.9 tons of VX, the production of 60 tons of crucial VX precursors and the acquisition of some 650 tons

of other precursors for the production of VX. Iraq also acknowledged that it had decided to conceal various aspects of its VX activities from the Special Commission and declared that, in 1991, it had unilaterally destroyed all VX and its main precursors as well as documents and records relevant to VX.

31. Concerning Iraqi efforts to retain chemical weapon-related equipment and materials, in 1997 the United Nations inspectors identified 325 additional items of production equipment, 125 analytical instruments and 275 tons of precursor chemicals procured by the former chemical weapon programme and retained by Iraq. The identification of the materials was made on the basis of multiple pieces of evidence gathered by the inspectors.

32. The verification experience of the Special Commission and UNMOVIC shows that a country's documentation of its chemical weapon programmes is critical for verification, since physical evidence may no longer exist. The intentional elimination or concealment of documentary evidence dramatically decreases confidence in the inspected party and leads to ambiguities that may never be resolved satisfactorily.

33. Given the absence of complete production, storage and deployment records, which according to Iraq were destroyed unilaterally, it was not possible for United Nations inspectors to verify fully the Iraqi declarations regarding overall quantities of chemical weapons produced, used or retained. Verification of the declarations was made more difficult since the major part of the bulk chemical warfare agents produced and chemical munitions filled over the period of 10 years had been used in combat. With regard to chemical agents and munitions remaining in Iraq as of 1991, there is a high degree of confidence that the vast majority of these have been declared by Iraq, identified by the inspectors and destroyed under international supervision. However, unilateral destruction by Iraq prolonged the verification process and left uncertainties regarding types and quantities of weapons it had destroyed.

34. A residue of uncertainty also remains with respect to chemical munitions that were lost, according to Iraq, after the 1991 Gulf war. The Iraq Survey Group quoted conflicting statements of former Iraqi officials, one individual suggesting that some 500 155-mm munitions were retained by Iraq and other officials insisting that they were actually destroyed.

35. Iraqi regular military units in theatres of operation received and used both conventional and chemical weapons. Because of the rapid relocation of many of those units and the dozens of facilities involved in the handling of the weapons, there is a possibility that chemical munitions have been inadvertently mixed with conventional weapons. Moreover, some chemical munitions filled with chemical warfare agents were marked as standard conventional weapons, which made their identification as chemical munitions problematic, not only for United Nations inspectors and later personnel of the Iraq Survey Group, but also for Iraq.

36. From information collected by the inspectors in Iraq, UNMOVIC assessed that, depending on the munitions models, types of chemical warfare agents, dates of production and filling and storage conditions, some chemical munitions, if remaining in Iraq, may still retain relatively high-purity chemical warfare agent, like mustard gas. Other munitions would contain degraded chemical warfare agents, binary components or only their residues.

37. The experience of verification of Iraqi chemical munitions also showed that to recognize the subtle modification used to convert conventional munitions into chemical munitions a detailed understanding of the original munition materials, design and manufacturing process was required. Understanding all conventional delivery means available to Iraq is another area essential for the recognition of Iraqi chemical weapon munitions, their distinctive parts and components.

38. Iraq is rich in natural resources such as oil, natural gas and minerals, including phosphate rock and sulphur. By-products from processing those reserves may be used for some chemical warfare agent precursors. Taking into account the pre-1991 efforts of Iraq to achieve self-reliance in the production of critical chemical warfare agent precursors from materials available in Iraq, it was critical for the monitoring system to also cover a portion of the Iraqi petrochemical and mining complex to prevent the conversion of commercial chemicals and capabilities for proscribed purposes.

United Nations S/2006/343

Security Council

Distr.: General
31 May 2006

Original: English

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming all its previous resolutions and statements pertaining to the situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea (hereinafter referred to as "the parties") and the requirements contained therein, including in particular resolutions 1320 of 15 September 2000, 1430 of 14 August 2002, 1466 of 14 March 2003, 1640 of 23 November 2005 and 1678 of 15 May 2006, as well as the statement of its President of 24 February 2006 (S/PRST/2006/10),

Stressing its unwavering commitment to the peace process, and to the full and expeditious implementation of the Algiers Agreements, and the importance of prompt implementation of the decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (S/2002/423) as a basis for peaceful and cooperative relations between the parties,

Reaffirming the integrity of the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) as provided in the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities of 18 June 2000 (S/2000/601) and recalling the objectives of its establishment and the commitment of the parties to respect the TSZ,

Stressing further that the full demarcation of the border between the two parties is vital to lasting peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea as well as in the region, and *recalling* that both parties have agreed to accept the delimitation and demarcation determinations of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) as final and binding,

Welcoming the convening of the EEBC meetings on 10 March and 17 May 2006 in London and supporting the ongoing EEBC process,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to ensure that the two parties, as agreed by them, permit the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) to perform its duties and provide UNMEE with the necessary access, assistance, support and protection required for the performance of these duties,

Commending the role of UNMEE and *expressing* once again its deep appreciation for the contribution and dedication of the troop-contributing countries to the work of UNMEE, despite the immense difficulties which they are facing,

Welcoming the Secretary-General's intention to keep the operations of UNMEE under close review continuing to take into account developments on the ground and the views of the parties, and to revert to the Council with

recommendations as appropriate for further adjustments to UNMEE's mandate, force levels and concept of operation as soon as warranted,

Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General of 3 January 2006 (S/2006/1) and of 6 March 2006 (S/2006/140) and the options on the future of UNMEE contained therein,

Noting paragraph 4 of resolution 1678 (2006),

1. *Decides* to extend the mandate of UNMEE for a period of four months, until 30 September 2006;

2. *Authorizes* the reconfiguration of UNMEE's military component and in this regard *approves* the deployment within UNMEE of up to 2,300 troops, including up to 230 military observers, with the existing mandate, as stipulated in resolution 1320 (2000) and further adjusted in resolution 1430 (2002);

3. *Demands* that the parties fully comply with resolution 1640 (2005);

4. *Calls* upon both parties to cooperate fully with the EEBC, in order to resume the demarcation process, stresses that the parties have primary responsibility for the implementation of the Algiers Agreements and *calls again* on the parties to implement completely and without further delay the decision of the EEBC and to create the necessary conditions for demarcation to proceed expeditiously;

5. *Demands* that the parties provide UNMEE with the necessary access, assistance, support and protection required for the performance of its duties, including its mandated task to assist the EEBC in the expeditious and orderly implementation of the Delimitation Decision, in accordance with resolutions 1430 (2002) and 1466 (2003) and demands that any restrictions be lifted immediately;

6. *Calls* on Member States to provide continued support for UNMEE and contributions to the Trust Fund, established pursuant to resolution 1177 (1998) and referred to in Article 4 (17) of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the Governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea on 12 December 2000, in order to support the demarcation process;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council closely and regularly informed of progress towards the implementation of this resolution;

8. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

United Nations S/2006/344

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 May 2006
English
Original: French

Letter dated 30 May 2006 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that the members of the Security Council have decided to send a mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 10 to 12 June 2006. The mission will be headed by Ambassador de La Sablière, of France. The members of the Security Council have approved the mandate of the mission, which is annexed hereto.

At the conclusion of the consultations among the members, it was agreed that the composition of the mission would be as follows:

Ambassador Jean-Marc de La Sablière (France), head of mission
Ambassador Basile Ikouebe (Congo)
Ambassador Lars Faaborg-Andersen (Denmark)
Ambassador Nana Effah-Apenteng (Ghana)
Ambassador Shinichi Kitaoka (Japan)
Counsellor Vitaliano Gallardo (Peru)
Ambassador Peter Burian (Slovakia)
Ambassador Augustine P. Mahiga (United Republic of Tanzania)
Minister William J. Brencick (United States of America)

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Basile **Ikouebe**
President of the Security Council

06-36722 (E) 310506 310506

Annex

Security Council mission on the electoral process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Kinshasa, 11 and 12 June 2006

1. The Security Council mission will welcome the progress achieved in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since the previous mission (4-10 November 2005): enactment of the electoral law, establishment of the electoral timetable and publication of the names of candidates for the presidential and legislative elections.

2. The mission will pay tribute to the Congolese nation, which has demonstrated its commitment to the democratic process under way. It will reiterate the Security Council's support for this process, which began with the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo of 17 December 2002, and which should lead to the establishment of democratic and sustainable institutions. It will commend the work of the Independent Electoral Commission and the other institutions in support of democracy, and will assure them of the Council's full support.

3. The mission will emphasize that the Transition, which has now entered its last phase, will not be complete until free elections open to all have taken place. While noting that the postponement of the first round of elections to 30 July 2006 was due to technical constraints, the mission will stress the importance of the polls taking place within the time limits set by the Independent Electoral Commission. It will refer to the unprecedented efforts made by the international community, in particular the United Nations, to support that process. It will call on Congolese stakeholders to commit themselves unequivocally and with an inclusive approach, in particular by ensuring that the electoral timetable is strictly adhered to.

4. The mission will encourage the transitional authorities to increase their efforts, with support from the International Committee in Support of the Transition (CIAT) and the international partners of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to guarantee the democratic character of the electoral process. It will stress the importance of equitable access by candidates to the media, impartial monitoring of the legality of the elections, and voter education. In this context it will commend the proposal to designate a Panel of Wise personalities.

5. The mission will underline its concerns about the security situation during the electoral period and stress that the elections must take place in a peaceful environment with the police ensuring law and order at polling stations. In that regard, it will commend the efforts undertaken by the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and the European Union.

6. The mission will stress that the elections are not an end in themselves, but an essential stage in ongoing efforts towards national reconciliation and reconstruction of the country. It will call on all Congolese stakeholders to commit themselves, once the Transition has ended, to continuing to work together in the nation's interest and to upholding standards of good governance and transparent economic management. It will reiterate the concerns of the Security Council, which will remain valid following the elections, in particular the integration of the army and the police, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, the disarmament, repatriation and resettlement of foreign armed groups, and the ending

of impunity for violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. It will express the willingness of the international community, in particular the United Nations, to maintain its cooperation with the Democratic Republic of the Congo on a long-term basis.

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Security Council

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30 May 2006
English
Original: French

Letter dated 22 May 2006 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

The members of the Security Council have taken note of your recommendations concerning the reinforcement the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (ONUCI). As you know, the Council plans to consider a resolution on the strengthening of the Operation. In anticipation of the decision to be taken by them in this regard, the members of the Council request you to begin, without delay, planning for the possible deployment of additional troops to reinforce ONUCI.

(*Signed*) Basile **Ikouebe**
President of the Security Council

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Sixtieth session
Agenda item 14
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Sixty-first year

Identical letters dated 30 May 2006 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly

On the instructions from my Government, I should like to bring to your attention the following:

1. In the wake of the assassination that took the lives of two Lebanese citizens in the city of Sidon on 26 May 2006 and the subsequent firing of missiles in the direction of the southern side of the Blue Line, by as yet unknown parties, many areas of Lebanon were subjected on Sunday, 28 May 2006, to heavy Israeli bombardment resulting in casualties and destruction of property, accompanied by threats by Israeli officials to bomb vital facilities in the capital, Beirut.

2. These tragic incidents experienced by Lebanon, which recur periodically, confirm yet again that conditions will not stabilize along Lebanon's international borders as long as the Israeli occupation of Lebanese territory in the Shaba farmlands and the Kafr Shuba hills and daily violations of Lebanese sovereignty (such as the overflight by 10 warplanes of the capital, Beirut, 24 hours after the ceasefire) continue. Their repeated occurrence poses a threat to peace and security not only in Lebanon, but in the Middle East region as a whole, as the Secretary-General has repeatedly warned in his periodic reports on the operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The stability of conditions along the entire Lebanese border, and within Lebanon and the region, is contingent on an end to the occupation, the implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions, and a commitment by Israel to abide by international legitimacy. You are aware of the urgent efforts being made by the Lebanese Government to spread peace and security, establish civil peace in Lebanon, and extend the rule of law throughout Lebanese territory. Any disturbance of security of any kind at this critical stage could obstruct these efforts and have a negative impact on citizens, as well as adverse implications for the outcome of the national dialogue conference that you have supported and encouraged.

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3. The Lebanese Government is resolved to pursue investigations to uncover the circumstances and conditions of the aggression against Lebanese citizens in the city of Sidon. The Lebanese Army Command, in conjunction with the UNIFIL Command, is also conducting the necessary investigations to ascertain the circumstances of the firing of missiles from Lebanese territory with a view to putting an end to them.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the present letter to be circulated as a document of the General Assembly at its sixtieth session, under agenda item 14, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Caroline **Ziadeh**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

United Nations A/ES-10/335–S/2006/347

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
30 May 2006

Original: English

General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Sixty-first year

Identical letters dated 30 May 2006 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

The situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, continues to deteriorate as a result of the escalation of military attacks and of unlawful punitive measures being carried out by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people. The rising lethal aggression of the occupying Power against the civilian population under its occupation is exacerbating the already tense and volatile conditions, threatening to further destabilize the grave situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

In this regard, the Israeli occupying forces today raided the Gaza Strip, entering the territory on the ground for the first time since the withdrawal from within Gaza in September of 2005, and launched an attack that resulted in the killing of three Palestinian men and one Palestinian police officer, who had rushed to the area with medics. The attack also wounded at least nine other civilians, including an ambulance driver and two journalists. The Israeli occupying forces have also continued to carry out military attacks and killings throughout the West Bank, including in the Balata refugee camp near the city of Nablus and in the town of Qabatiya near the city of Tulkarem. In addition, inter alia, to the daily raids and unlawful arrests and detentions being carried out by the occupying Power, and coming on the heels of the military attack in the centre of the city of Ramallah just days ago, such an escalation in targeted killings and attacks is fuelling the frustrations and anger of the Palestinian civilian population and risks plunging the situation into even greater upheaval and instability.

The international community, including the Security Council, cannot remain silent and must give this intensifying crisis its serious attention, with the aim of bringing an end to the ongoing breaches of international law by Israel, the occupying Power, and of stemming the dangerous descent into another vicious cycle

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of violence. The continuous military attacks and other ongoing grave violations of international law, including humanitarian and human rights law, being committed by the occupying Power against the Palestinian people are destabilizing the fragile situation on the ground and deepening the dire humanitarian crisis from which the population is already suffering. The international community must uphold its responsibilities in this regard and take the necessary measures to compel Israel, the occupying Power, to cease its military aggressions and violations against the Palestinian people and to scrupulously respect all of its obligations under international law.

The present letter is in follow-up to our previous 243 letters to you regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, since 28 September 2000. These letters, dated from 29 September 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921) to 25 May 2006 (A/ES-10/333-S/2006/330), constitute a basic record of the crimes being committed by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people since September 2000. For all of these war crimes, State terrorism and systematic human rights violations committed against the Palestinian people, Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable and the perpetrators must be brought to justice.

Accordingly, in follow-up to the above-mentioned letters, I regret to inform you that, in the few days since my last letter to you, at least 13 more Palestinian civilians, including two children, have been killed by the Israeli occupying forces, raising the total number of martyrs killed since September 2000 to 3,880. (The names of the martyrs who have been identified are listed in the annex to the present letter.)

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Feda Abdelhady **Nasser**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex to the identical letters dated 30 May 2006 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Names of martyrs killed by the Israeli occupying forces in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem*

(Friday, 26 May to Tuesday, 30 May 2006)

Friday, 26 May 2006

1. Mustafa Shehada Qassem
2. Mohammad Youssef Qassem (18 years old)
3. Arafah Basheer Zarandah (15 years old)

Monday, 29 May 2006

1. Ala'a Atef Jabr Hujair (died of wounds sustained on 15 April)
2. Abdel Mu'ti Shakir Al-Err

Tuesday, 30 May 2006

1. Tarek Ahmad Zakarnah
2. Omar Abu Raddah (died of wounds sustained on 29 May 2006)
3. Mohammad Khalil Mattar
4. Youssef Abu Miza
5. Osama Al-Nimri
6. Hanni Al-Saqqa
7. Sabri Abu-Qlaiq
8. Abdel-Rahman Shanab

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* The total number of Palestinian martyrs killed by the Israeli occupying forces since 28 September 2000 is 3,880.

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Security Council

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30 May 2006

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General Assembly
Sixtieth session
Agenda items 14 and 108

Security Council
Sixty-first year

The situation in the Middle East

Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Identical letters dated 30 May 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

It is with great dismay that yet another terrorist attack has been perpetrated against the citizens of Israel. Over the weekend, the Hizbollah terrorist organization fired eight Katyusha rockets deep into northern Israel from Lebanese territory, wounding an Israeli soldier and resulting in an extensive exchange of fire along the Lebanese border.

We hold not only the Government of Lebanon fully responsible for all terrorist activity emanating from within its territory but also hold responsible the Governments of Iran and Syria for harbouring, financing, nurturing and supporting Hizbollah and other terrorist organizations.

Israel urges the United Nations and the Government of Lebanon to ensure that all obligations set out in Security Council resolutions 425 (1978), 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006) are fulfilled. The time has come for the sovereign Government of Lebanon to extend its control over all of its territory and disband Hizbollah and other terrorist organizations.

I submit the present letter in follow-up to an oral complaint lodged on Sunday, 28 May 2006.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the present letter distributed as a document of the sixtieth session of the General Assembly, under agenda items 14 and 108, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Dan **Gillerman**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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